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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
vestigations of serious defects in
various makes and models of new
cars, which often were not discovered during the standard one
year/12,000 mile warranty. In light
of this, the court stated that the
New York State legislature had
enacted section 198-a(b) to redress
the significant problem with the
automotive industry's warranty
practices.
The court disagreed with the
Association's contention that the
costs of complying with the law
impacted adversely on interstate
commerce. First, most automobile
manufacturers were not affected
by the statute because they offered
warranties in excess of the statutory requirements. Second, many of
those affected by the statute had
simply passed along the costs of
compliance to purchasers. For instance, Ford Motors charged New
York consumers an extra $115.00
for "Mandatory New York Repair
Coverage" on a new car. Finally,
manufacturers had shown an ability to adapt to other state regulations having a much greater impact
on the distribution and manufacture of cars than did section 198a(b). Automobile manufacturers
had made such adjustments as reprogramming computers, changing
advertising, tracing the ownership
of vehicles and even offering distinct warranties. The record
showed that manufacturers were
able to make these adjustments
with minimal disruption to the
nationwide automobile distribution.
The Association further argued that it was impossible for
manufacturers to put state-specific
warranty information in vehicles
prior to shipment to dealers. However, the court held that this claim
was frivolous. Ford Motor Company currently disclosed the contents
of section 198-a(b) to New York
purchasers. Furthermore, as the
record showed, manufacturers had
little difficulty in disclosing other
state-specific substantive information. Moreover, the court noted,
section 198-a(b) did not require
manufacturers to disclose anything. The court noted that even if
the statute required disclosure,
such disclosure would be feasible.
By analogy, the credit card indusVolume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990

try disclosed the interest rates
charged in all fifty states. Regardless, the court stated that disclosure is a "tolerable by-product" of
doing business on the national level.
The Association finally argued that section 198-a(b) advantaged in-state business over out-ofstate business. The court held that
the statute did not advantage some
manufacturers at the expense of
others because the statute applied
to all manufacturers equally. Accordingly, the court held that the
benefits of section 198-a(b) exceeded the burdens it imposed on interstate commerce. Because the burden was minimal and did not
discriminate against out-of-state
businesses, the court upheld the
section 198-a(b) repair provision.
Marianne L. Simonini

LANDOWNERS ARE
NOT REQUIRED TO
EXERCISE GREATER
CARE TOWARD
LICENSEES THAN
INVITEES
In Gallegos v. Phipps, 779
P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989), the Colorado Supreme Court examined a
Colorado landowner's duty to protect an invitee injured upon his
land under a recently enacted landowner liability statute. 6A Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-21-115 (1987). The
court determined that the statute
violated both the federal and state
constitutional guarantee of equal
protection by imposing on landowners a higher standard of care
for licensees than for invitees.
Background
On December 28, 1986, appellant, Bernie L. Gallegos ("Gallegos") patronized The Ram, a restaurant and bar located in
Georgetown, Colorado. Gallegos
became visibly intoxicated during
his visit there, and upon leaving
The Ram, fell down a flight of
stairs and was seriously injured.
Gallegos brought suit against The
Ram's management (Red Ram

Management) and the owners of
the premises (Red Ram Venture)
(all co-defendants are hereinafter
referred to collectively as "Red
Ram").
At the jury trial, Gallegos argued that Red Ram violated section 13-21-115 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes, Colo. Rev. Stat. §
13-21-115 (1987), by serving Gallegos too much alcohol and then
deliberately failing to exercise reasonable care to protect him against
a known danger: the stairwell. Gallegos contended that the stairwell
created a danger not ordinarily
present on property of that type.
Gallegos also argued, in the alternative, that section 13-21-115 denied him equal protection of the
laws because it required landowners to warn licensees, but not invitees, of dangers on their property.
Red Ram offered evidence
that not only were the stairs typical
of those found in similar Georgetown buildings, but that the stairs
were safely constructed and maintained. Red Ram further contended that Gallegos fell down the
stairs while in a self-induced
"drunken stupor'."
The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Red Ram, specifically
finding that Gallegos' injuries were
not caused by any dangerous condition at The Ram, that Red Ram
did not deliberately fail to exercise
reasonable care, and that Gallegos
was injured by his own negligence.
The Colorado Supreme
Court's Decision
Gallegos appealed directly to
the Supreme Court of Colorado,
asserting, among other things, that
section 13-21-115 unconstitutionally violated his rights to equal
protection under the laws. Specifically, he argued that the statutory
scheme was arbitrary, unreasonable, and bore no rational relationship to a legitimate state objective
because it provided less protection
to invitees than to licensees. The
statute caused similarly situated
parties (tort victims) to be treated
dissimilarly because tort vitims of
landowners must prove that the
landowner acted deliberately,
while victims of other types of
tortfeasors need only prove negli(continued on page 86)
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gence.
The Colorado Supreme Court
first considered Gallegos' claim
that section 13-21-115 violated the
protections provided by the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1, and the due
process clause of the Colorado
Constitution, Colo. Const. art. II, §
25. The first section of the fourteenth amendment provides that
"no state shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Article II,
section 25, of the Colorado Constitution "guarantees that all parties
who are similarly situated receive
like treatment by the law." Colo.
Const. art. II, § 25. Since the
statute did not infringe on a fundamental right, a suspect class, or a
classification triggering an intermediate standard of review, the
court determined that in order to
prevail in his claim that section
13-21-115 was unconstitutional,
Gallegos had to prove that the
section 13-21-115 had no rational
basis in fact and bore no rational
relationship to a legitimate Colorado state interest. To determine
whether Gallegos met his burden,
the court used a two part test. First,
the court ascertained the legitimate
state interest that section
13-21-115 was intended to promote. Next, the court determined
whether the statute actually promoted that interest.
Purpose of Landowner Liability Statute. The court ascertained
the Colorado legislature's purpose
in enacting section 13-21-115 by
reviewing the history of Colorado
landowner liability law, the circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment, and the intentions
expressed by the legislators who
sponsored the legislation in the
General Assembly. The court noted that prior to 1971, Colorado
followed the common law with
respect to landowner liability. The
common law traditionally imposed
upon landowners a greater duty of
care towards invitees than licensees or trespassers. For example, a
landowner was merely required to
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refrain from willfully or wantonly
injuring a licensee, but the landowner had an affirmative duty to
make his land reasonably safe for
invitees.
In 1971, the Colorado Supreme Court abolished the use of
the common law distinctions between licensees, invitees, and trespassers, and imposed a general
standard of care upon landowners.
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,
175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308
(1971). Under this more general
standard, a landowner was simply
required to manage his land as a
reasonable person would in view of
the foreseeability of injuries to
others. However, in 1986, the Colorado legislature noted that the
reasonable person standard established by Mile High Fence led to
unpredictable and inequitable results, especially with regard to trespassers. Therefore, the legislature
enacted section 13-21-115.
The Colorado legislature expressly enacted section 13-21-115
to promote responsibility among
both landowners and those upon
the land by re-establishing the
common law distinction among
trespassers, licensees, and invitees,
and defining a landowner's duty of
care according to the landowner's
relationship to the person upon his
land. The court in the present case
found that this purpose addressed
a legitimate state interest, and
thereby satisfied the first part of
the two part test.
Promoting the State's Interest. The court next addressed
whether section 13-21-115 promoted the state's interest. The
court examined the language of the
section as it pertained to licensees
and invitees and determined that
section 13-21-115 inverted a landowner's duties, as compared to the
common law, by according a higher degree of protection to a licensee
than an invitee. This result defeated the Colorado legislature's intent
of re-establishing the common law
scheme of landowner liability. It
also contradicted logical reasoning
which requires a landowner to take
more precautions to protect someone he has invited on his land for

his own purposes, than a person
whose presence is merely permitted. The court held that section
13-21-115 could not be interpreted
to fairly allocate responsibility
within the limitations imposed by
the federal and state constitutional
guarantees of equal protection of
the law, and was, therefore, unconstitutional.
Because the verdict against
Gallegos was based on Red Ram's
duties toward Gallegos under section 13-21-115, the court reversed
the judgment and remanded the
case for a new trial under the
standard of liability imposed prior
to the enactment of section
13-21-115.
Karen M. Cichowski

TAMPONS AND
SANITARY NAPKINS
ARE MEDICAL
APPLIANCES EXEMPT
FROM CHICAGO
SALES TAX
In Geary v. Dominick's Finer
Foods, Inc., 129 Ill.2d 389, 544
N.E.2d 344 (1989), purchasers of
female hygenic products ("the purchasers") brought a class action
suit alleging that the City of Chicago illegally taxed tampons and sanitary napkins purchased from various retailers. The Illinois Supreme
Court found that because the products were necessities with no substitutes, the purchasers had no
choice but to pay the taxes. Therefore, the court held that the purchasers, having paid under duress,
could challenge the tax. On the
merits, the court held that tampons
and sanitary napkins were "medical appliances" and exempt from
the city sales tax.
Background
The purchasers' class action
suit alleged that the Illinois Department of Revenue, the City of
Chicago, the Chicago Department
of Revenue, and the Regional
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